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This paper  reports  the  results  of  a  stated  preference  experiment  designed  to  test how
information  about  a good’s  attributes  provided  in  a  survey  affects  knowledge,  and  how
knowledge affects  preferences  for  that good.  A novel  experimental  design  allows  us  to  elicit
subjects’ ex  ante  knowledge  levels  about  a public  good’s  attributes,  exogenously  vary  how
much new  objective  information  about  these  attributes  we  provide  to  subjects,  elicit  sub-
jects’ valuation  for the  good,  and  elicit  posterior  knowledge  states  about  the  same  attributes.
We ﬁnd  evidence  of incomplete  learning  and  fatigue:  as subjects  are  told more  information,
their  marginal  learning  rates  decrease.  Consistent  with  previous  work, ex  ante  knowledge
does  affect  stated  willingness  to  pay.  However,  we  ﬁnd  no  signiﬁcant  marginal  impact  of
knowledge  on  the  mean  nor  the variance  of  willingness  to pay  for changes  in the  environ-
mental  good  conditional  on  ex  ante  knowledge.  Our  results  are  consistent  with  a number
of  conceptual  models  of  information  processing  and  preferences,  including  conﬁrmation
bias,  costly  search,  and  timing  differences  in  learning  and  preference  formation.
©  2018  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
Understanding how agents respond to information when choosing amongst or valuing goods is important. The economics
iterature has set out a number of alternatives to “traditional” models of costless learning and complete information retention.
or example, models of bounded rationality, costly learning, fatigue, and cognitive load all imply agents do not completely
bsorb new information (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Caplin et al., 2011; Gabaix et al., 2006; Sims, 2003). There is a tension in
ome cases between neutral information processing (Gabaix et al., 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974) and deviations
rom this (Eil and Rao, 2011; Fernbach et al., 2012; Grossman and Owens, 2012; Rabin and Schrag, 1999).
How people respond to information takes on added importance in the use of stated preference techniques to estimate
emand for public goods. Mitchell and Carson (1989) identiﬁed information provision as “amongst the most important and
ost problematic sources of error” in contingent valuation surveys. Respondents are often asked to value complex and (in
any cases) unfamiliar goods, and it is unlikely that all or indeed most respondents will have well-deﬁned preferences prior
o elicitation (Gregory et al., 1995; Gregory and Slovic, 1997). Preference construction is affected by how the respondent
rocesses the information presented to them, which information they select and their own  prior knowledge about the good
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(Payne et al., 2000). Schläpfer (2008) argues that it is unlikely respondents will form consistent preferences unless the survey
offers reliable contextual cues and Bateman et al. (2008) argue that failing to accommodate low informed respondents will
lead to high variance willingness to pay (WTP) estimates.
Best practices in stated preference contingent valuation surveys are that the survey instrument includes background
information about a public good project. Johnston et al. (2017) state that: “stated preference questionnaires should clearly
present the baseline (or status quo) condition(s), the mechanism of change, and the change(s) to be valued and should
elicit evidence that these pieces of information are understood, accepted, and viewed as credible by respondents”. Baseline
information in stated preference studies should be neutral, deemed technically correct by experts and seen as relevant by
stakeholders and pilot participants. But how much baseline information is “enough”? There is a tension between providing
sufﬁcient information needed to establish “baseline conditions” and over-loading respondents with superﬂuous detail. This
paper attempts to test how additional neutral and relevant information impacts knowledge about the good and estimated
WTP  for a change in that good. A novel experimental design is used to cast light on what the appropriate level of “baseline
information” is in a contingent valuation study.
We  are interested in the interaction between two  important strands of the literature. First, how much a subject knows
about a good before a survey begins is often correlated with their WTP  (Cameron and Englin, 1997; Loomis and Ekstrand,
1998; Tkac, 1998): subjects tend to know more about things they care about or have experience with (Czajkowski et al.,
2015a). Second, information about the management, characteristics and attributes of a public good provided during a survey
has been found to both inﬂuence and not inﬂuence stated valuations (see Munro and Hanley, 2001 for a summary of the
early literature). A natural question, then, is how respondents’ ex-ante knowledge levels about an environmental good affect
the causal impact of knowledge acquired about this good during a stated preference survey on WTP. Speciﬁcally, could the
effects on stated WTP  of providing information be driven by heterogeneity in the ex-ante information sets of people in the
sample? Put another way, are less informed subjects more likely to be inﬂuenced by “new” information about the good?
This relates to a normative question for survey instrument design: what is the appropriate quantity of information about a
good to provide to subjects?1
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test for how providing information about the attributes of
an environmental public good affects respondents’ knowledge; and how that new knowledge affects the distribution of
valuations for the public good conditioning on a subject’s ex ante knowledge levels. We  deﬁne information, learning and
knowledge as follows: information is a speciﬁc fact; learning is being able to recall a speciﬁc fact from a choice set (e.g.,
in a multiple choice test); knowledge is a set of learned information. Unlike previous literature, the novel experimental
design allows us to elicit subjects’ prior knowledge levels about a good’s attributes; exogenously vary how much new
information about the good’s attributes we provide to subjects; elicit subjects’ valuation for the good and ﬁnally measure
posterior knowledge states about the same attributes. Because we  experimentally vary information in the experiment in
addition to testing for knowledge states at the start of the survey, we can identify causal estimates for the marginal effect
of new information provided on knowledge and the marginal effect of knowledge on valuation for a good, conditioning
on a subject’s ex ante level of knowledge. We  are not aware of prior work in the literature which does this. Our design
also provides an opportunity to compare different cognitive models of learning and stated valuation adjustment which has
received increasing attention in the economics literature.
There are two main results. First, giving subjects more information causes signiﬁcant learning, although observed learning
is incomplete. We  also ﬁnd that as subjects are told more information, their marginal learning rates decrease. This is consistent
with a model of imperfect learning and fatigue. Second, new knowledge about a good’s attributes does not signiﬁcantly affect
valuations for that good. We  do ﬁnd systematic correlations between ex ante levels of information and valuations: ex ante
more knowledgeable subjects valued the good less than ex ante less knowledgeable subjects. However, learning additional
information did not affect these valuations holding the ex ante knowledge levels ﬁxed. Further, the additional information
did not affect the variance of the distribution of valuations.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we can jointly test for how information affects knowledge
and how knowledge affects preferences in a uniﬁed framework. Previously, literature, which varies access to information
about environmental goods, only varies information without verifying that it has been learned (Bergstrom et al., 1989; Boyle,
1989; Hoehn et al., 2010; Smith et al., 1988). As a result, we can estimate average treatment effects (ATEs) rather than intent
to treat (ITT) effects.
Second, we are also able to test for the causal impact of information and learning, conditioning on ex ante levels of
knowledge. Previous literature has shown that different ex ante levels of information can signiﬁcantly change stated WTP
(Cameron and Englin, 1997; Loomis and Ekstrand, 1998; Tkac, 1998). In the closest experimental design to ours, Boyle (1989)
ﬁnds that information about management costs and management practices can inﬂuence the variance but not the mean of
the WTP  distribution. However, Boyle (1989) was not able to identify if this effect varies across the population by information
sets.
1 A related question we  do not address here is: conditional on quantity, what is the right composition of information about a good to provide subjects. This
paper  focuses on the quantity question surrounding information provision (extensive margin) only but similar issues exist for the composition questions
around information provision (intensive margin); see Munro and Hanley (2001) for a summary of early work on this issue.
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Third, we focus speciﬁcally on the objective characteristics of the good which we  can conﬁrm were unknown to the
ubject. Other studies of information in a stated preference context focus on different forms of information such as redundant
nformation (Viscusi and O’Connor, 1984), the relative cost of management versus a subject’s income (Bergstrom et al.,
989), and speciﬁcity of management actions (Boyle, 1989). Our paper estimates the marginal impact of both information
nd acquired knowledge about public good attributes on WTP, conditional on prior knowledge levels.
In addition, because we are able to test for ex ante and ex post knowledge states, vary levels of information, identify
hat information creates knowledge and subsequently estimate WTP, we  have the necessary features to link this large and
omewhat older literature on information effects in contingent valuation to a newer economics literature on updating and
aluation. Speciﬁcally, recent advances highlight how cognitive constraints, costly effort, endogenous search and conﬁr-
atory bias can inﬂuence both learning and subsequent valuation (Aadland et al., 2007; Caplin and Dean, 2015; Caplin
t al., 2011; De los Santos et al., 2012; Rabin and Schrag, 1999). This is important, as recent evidence suggests there can be
nexpected departures from neoclassical models of updating in stated preference studies (LaRiviere et al., 2014).
Finally, because we simultaneously track both the causal effects of information on knowledge and knowledge on valuation,
e are able to compare several different models of learning, information process and preference formation in a uniﬁed
ramework. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst such comparison in a stated preference survey. Together with our results on
earning, our results turn out to be consistent with three models of preference formation: 1) conﬁrmatory bias (Rabin and
chrag, 1999), 2) heterogeneous preferences and endogenous costly information acquisition decisions, similar in spirit to
aplin et al. (2011) and Caplin and Dean (2015) and 3) a timing lag between learning and preference formation.
. Survey, experimental design, and hypotheses
Our experiment has four key components. First, the design allows us to test for how much information respondents
ossess about the good in question at the outset of the experiment: that is, to measure their ex ante knowledge about
he good’s attributes. Second, the design also allows us to test how much of the new information provided to respondents
s learned. Third, we are able to observe how new knowledge induced by exogenously varying levels of information affect
aluations for the good. Fourth, we can use the design to test whether our ﬁndings are consistent or inconsistent with several
ifferent models of learning and preference formation recently developed in the economics literature.
.1. Prior valuation studies
Early stated preference research began to question how the quantity and quality of information provided in surveys
nﬂuences both the mean and variance of the WTP  estimate. Results were mixed: some studies showed that increasing infor-
ation provided did not affect mean WTP, but the variance of the estimate reduced with increasing information (Boyle, 1989;
ergstrom et al., 1989). Other studies showed that providing more positive information increased mean WTP  (Bergstrom
nd Stoll, 1990) but that there is a level of saturation where further new information no longer affects the estimates (Munro
nd Hanley, 2001).
Further research questioned the role of a respondent’s prior knowledge on uncertainty in the WTP  estimate (Loomis
nd Ekstrand, 1998). Tkac (1998) used a quiz to test the respondent’s prior knowledge on the good being valued and found
hat increased prior knowledge was positively correlated with WTP  although these respondents were less receptive to
ew information. Hoehn and Randall (2002) extended this work and found that the effect of new information was uneven
cross respondents with some respondents revising their WTP  upwards and some revising it downwards in response to new
nformation.
More recent work has used “quizzes” as a means of testing respondent’s prior knowledge of the good in question and
nvestigated how this affects their WTP  estimate and the interpretation of the information provided to them during the
urvey. Hasselström and Håkansson (2014) found that WTP  differed signiﬁcantly between the “detailed” and “fuzzy” infor-
ation sets for low knowledge respondents but not for high familiarity respondents. Recent work on the valuation of cold
ater corals in Norway also used a quiz to examine respondent’s knowledge and familiarity with the good (LaRiviere et al.,
014). An eight-question quiz grouped respondents into high and low knowledge following an initial presentation on cold
ater corals. LaRiviere et al. found that more knowledge led to respondents being more consistent in their choices, whilst
hose who scored above the mean were prepared to pay signiﬁcantly more towards cold water coral protection. Using the
ame dataset, Sandorf et al. (2017) demonstrated that respondents with more knowledge were more likely to attend to the
ttributes in choice experiments. Jones et al. (2017) show that describing types of value which can be created from a project
n different ways (e.g., not describing versus describing them) can impact WTP  studies. Results indicated that between 78%
nd 94% of respondents learned something new and useful from the new information provided to them.
We embedded our experiment within a stated preference survey concerning a population’s WTP  for a project to restore
oastal (estuarine) wetlands as a way of mitigating ﬂood risk (known as managed realignment). Managed realignment
ffers several beneﬁts over traditional hard concrete defenses. Estuarine wetlands make use of the storm buffering capacity
f intertidal habitats, as well as providing additional ﬂoodplains during high tides and storm surges (King and Lester, 1995).
n addition, wetlands also provide amenity value by increasing habitat for wildlife, along with numerous other ecosystem
ervice beneﬁts such as pollution reduction and acting as a nursery for early-life stages of ﬁsh and shellﬁsh (Barbier, 2011).
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When planning managed realignment schemes there is a need to engage with the general public as there is a legacy of local
residents being opposed to such schemes (Ledoux et al., 2005).
We designed a contingent valuation survey to value a single speciﬁc managed realignment scheme on the Tay Estuary
in Scotland. The survey was designed following the recommendations of Carson (2000)2. An initial focus group was  held
to reﬁne both the information and the valuation portions of the survey with staff and students at the University of Stirling.
This was followed by a pilot survey sent to 250 households within the study region, to which 50 households responded. The
survey sample was restricted to Scottish residents within the local authority areas who  would be responsible for paying for
the managed realignment scheme via their local council tax. These restrictions were applied to the Scottish Phone Directory
database, which holds the names and addresses of the population based on the Electoral Register, and 4000 households were
randomly selected to take part in the ﬁnal survey. Due to the experimental design, the survey could only be undertaken
online, using a website we designed and operated via Survey Gizmo. Respondents were invited to take part through targeted
postal mailings. Respondents received a letter on University of Stirling headed paper inviting them to take part in the survey
and were given details of the survey website. A reminder card was  sent two weeks after the ﬁrst contact attempt. Subjects
who completed the survey were given a £10 ($16) Amazon gift card. Of the 4000 people contacted, 749 people completed
the online survey with 593 usable (fully completed) responses: a response rate of 15%. The response rate is comparable with
a similar UK wide stated preference survey for ﬂood defense (12%) (Joseph et al., 2015), as well as other UK postal stated
preference surveys that had response rates ranging from 11% to 22% (Burton et al., 2001; Hanley et al., 2010).
The order of the survey was as follows. Subjects were told that their responses would help inform policy-makers improve
the management of ﬂooding in their local area. They were then given a nine-question multiple choice quiz related to objective
information about ﬂooding, ﬂood protection and wetlands. Each question was  designed to correspond to different attributes
of the proposed project, such as the way in which wetlands beneﬁt wildlife and the proportion of homes in the study area
which are currently classiﬁed as at risk from ﬂooding. We  justiﬁed the quiz as a way of informing policymakers how well this
topic was being communicated to and understood by the community. The quiz was developed with academics specializing
in ﬂood risk management to ensure the questions and answers were appropriate and accurate. Respondents were then given
either three, six or nine pieces of additional information about the attributes of the proposed ﬂood defense strategy. Each
piece of information provided to subjects corresponded to a single multiple choice question from the quiz in accordance
with the randomized experiment design detailed in the next subsection.
The nine questions reﬂect the kinds of additional information commonly provided in stated preference surveys. They
cover ecosystem service co-beneﬁts of the new managed realignment scheme, the historical baseline, and the environmental
problem (here, increasing ﬂood risks). Providing this type of background information is in line with best practices (Johnston
et al., 2017). Each of the bullet points we provide is relevant for the case we  consider. For example, in talking about the
current baseline type of ﬂood protection we include a question and bullet point about existing ﬂood protection methods.
We do the same regarding coastal wetlands and their impact on waterbird populations. In designing a survey instrument
the designer must make a call about what background information to include and what not to include. This paper distils
that background information about the project (e.g., historical ﬂood protection and ecosystem relationships) into nine bullet
points then randomly varies the amount provided to subjects.
Following the quiz, the managed realignment scenario was  then detailed, including a map  of where the scheme would take
place, how many homes would be protected and the length of time the natural ﬂood defense would take to become effective.
A status quo scenario of continued reliance on existing hard defenses with no managed realignment was also included. The
cost of the project was described as being increases in respondent’s council tax to fund the scheme; respondents were
told that this cost was currently subject to some uncertainty, motivating the use of a payment card. Council tax was a
plausible payment vehicle as local authorities are responsible for funding ﬂood defense in Scotland. We  then elicited WTP
for the managed realignment scheme using a payment card ranging from £0 to £150: respondents were asked to tick all
the amounts which the household was WTP  towards the scheme. The values were chosen based on feedback from initial
focus groups. Immediately following the WTP  elicitation, respondents repeated the original nine-question quiz. A series
of debrieﬁng questions followed, including questions regarding perceived ﬂood risk, as well as a set of socio-demographic
questions. Note that we  chose not to ask valuations more than once in our survey because in our view that compromised
the external validity of our results. Table 1 shows a summary of our survey’s timing.
To foster policy consequentiality, several reminder cues indicating that the results would be shared with policymakers
were included in the survey, speciﬁcally:
“The price you choose will be used to inform the local authorities and the Scottish Government when deciding future
ﬂood defense options in the Tay Estuary.”
“Remember that your preferences will be used in conjunction with costs of the scheme, when they are known, by
local authorities and the Scottish Government to inform which ﬂood defense policy is chosen”
We chose to use a payment card format for three main reasons. First, the government was only considering a single
policy of a ﬁxed design. As a result, any form of discrete choice experiment was inappropriate since we were not interested
2 A copy of the survey is available on request from the corresponding author.
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Table  1
Survey summary.
1. Subject begins survey
2. Nine question multiple choice quiz
3. Randomly assigned treatment group (conditional on quiz score)
4.  Managed realignment policy outlined, including costs, timescale and status quo scenario
5.  Respondents receive their additional three, six or nine pieces of information
6.  Elicit WTP  for managed realignment scheme
7. Second quiz
8. Series of follow up questions regarding ﬂood risk attitudes
9. Socio-demographic questions
Box 1: Elicitation scenario in the contingent valuation survey.
We would now like you to think about the value to you personally of developing this managed realignment scheme for
Newburgh on the Tay Estuary:
• On the next page you will be shown a table of prices that would be added to your council tax annually to cover the
costs and maintenance of the scheme.
• You are asked to choose amongst a variety of price options as the precise costs of going ahead with the managed
realignment scheme at present are unknown.
• The price you choose will be used to inform the local authorities and the Scottish Government when deciding future
ﬂood defense options in the Tay Estuary.
• Before you answer carefully consider the cost to you. Think about your household budget and what you would have
to trade off to pay for the increase in council tax e.g. what you like to buy or a reduction in your planned savings. The
average household council tax bill in Scotland is £984 per year.
What happens if there is no Managed Realignment Scheme?
• If the managed realignment scheme does not take place the existing ﬂood defenses (seawalls) will continue to be
maintained by the local authorities at no additional cost on your council tax bill.
• However there will be no additional ﬂood protection and additional beneﬁts of managed realignment will not be
realized.
Remember that your preferences will be used in conjunction with costs of the scheme, when they are known, by local
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n estimating the relative value of different attributes of the project or different ecosystem service values. Second, we
hose not to use a binary dichotomous choice (BDC) format due to the inherent noise and lack of statistical efﬁciency in a
DC format, whilst using a Double Bounded format often gives rise to inconsistencies between the initial and second bid
esponse (Bateman et al., 2008; Whitehead, 2002). Finally, because the parameter of interest for us is the marginal impact of
andomized treatment relative to a baseline (e.g., no new information) on WTP, we  do not need to concern ourselves with
he anchoring problems faced by payment cards, since any anchoring effects would be shared by both subjects receiving
ore information and those receiving less information. Moreover, as we are interested in the treatment effect of information
rovision and not in the aggregate beneﬁts of the project in this paper, we view anchoring bias as a second order problem.
owever, we recognize that payment cards are not widely viewed as incentive compatible (Carson and Groves, 2007). In
articular, there are concerns that payment cards can lead to participants under-revealing demand for the good and that in
any cases payment cards do not follow an implementation rule.
However, our scenario and the payment card we  employ reﬂect the recommendations of Vossler and Holladay (2018)
ho considered incidences where payment cards can be incentive compatible. Our payment card was presented as a series
f yes/no votes and we asked subjects to answer “yes” to each payment level that the household would deﬁnitely be willing
o pay. We highlighted that the overall cost of the wetlands project was uncertain, explaining why a range of payments
ptions were offered. The elicitation scenario is provided in Box 1.
It is useful to reemphasize the goal of the experiment at this stage: we are interested in the causal marginal impact of
 larger quantity of information relating to a good’s attributes on stated WTP. There are other types of information, which
re important (e.g., reminders of budget constraints, statements about consequentiality, etc.). We focus narrowly on the
uantity of information about public good attributes. A slightly different question regards the content of a given amount of
nformation or public good project, but we leave that analysis for future work..2. Experimental design
As stated above, at the beginning of the survey, we  gave subjects a nine-question multiple choice quiz. Each question
elated to a single piece of information about the public good project. After the ﬁrst multiple choice quiz, the number of
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Table 2
Type - treatment pairs.
Ex Ante Information
Treatment L M H
H LH MH HH
M  LM MM —
L  LL — —
Columns of the table represent the groupings (L, M,  H) by the ﬁrst test score and rows represent alternative treatments. To focus on the effect of new
information we  never treat subjects with less information than their ex ante knowledge.
correct answers, the speciﬁc questions answered correctly and the speciﬁc questions answered incorrectly were recorded
for each subject. We  then grouped respondents into a priori knowledge types as a function of the number of correct answers:
low (L), medium (M)  and high (H). A priori type L corresponds to 1–3 correct answers, type M corresponds to 4–6 correct
answers and type H corresponds to 7–9 correct answers.
After subjects completed the initial quiz and their answers were recorded, we  randomly assigned each subject to a
treatment. A treatment in our case was an amount of information about the attributes of the good. Treatments could be
low (L), medium (M)  or high (H). Each treatment corresponds to a number (3, 6 or 9 for L, M or H respectively) of bullet
points and/or ﬁgures conveying precise and objective information about the issue (ﬂooding) or good (new coastal wetlands).
Each bullet point and/or ﬁgure corresponds exactly to one question asked on the multiple choice questionnaire. As a result,
after treatment assignment, each agent can be summarized as a type/treatment pair in addition to information about their
correct and incorrect answers. For example, a type treatment pair could be MH:  a subject who  answers between four and
six questions correctly and who is then given all nine bullet points of information.
Importantly, respondents were always given information they answered correctly before any additional information was
given as dictated by treatment. For example, assume respondent A gets questions 2 and 7 correct and that they are in the
L treatment.  Respondent A is type L since they only got two out of 9 questions correct. The information set that they would
then be provided with consisted of two bullet points associated with questions 2 and 7 and, additionally, one information
bullet point selected at random from the remaining 7. Alternatively, assume respondent B gets questions 7, 8, and 9 correct
and they are in the M treatment. They are type L since they scored three out of nine. Their bullet points would be the three
bullet points associated with questions 7, 8 and 9 and three randomly chosen bullet points which correspond to questions
1 through 6. At no point was a subject told the number of questions which they answered correctly, that they correctly
answered any particular question, nor that the information they were given related to quiz material. In this respect, the only
difference between a standard stated preference survey and our survey before eliciting WTP  was a short multiple choice
quiz at the beginning.
The reason for not randomly selecting information is that we are concerned with the marginal effect of new information
on learning and preference formation. In order for the experimental design to be valid, we must make sure that, on average, a
type-treatment pair of LL is the proper counterfactual for type-treatment pair LM.  If the information treatment does not span
the agent’s a priori information set (e.g., an individual’s type), then the proper counterfactual cannot be ensured. Speciﬁcally,
imagine the situation above in which respondent A gets questions 2 and 7 correct but their L treatment are bullet points
associated with questions 3, 4 and 5. In that case, respondent A could test as a type M ex post when their information set is
elicited later in the protocol.
The type-treatment pairs and treatment information sets are summarized in Table 2. Columns represent the types (L, M,
H) deﬁned by the a priori test score, and rows represent the groups based upon treatment. There are up to nine potential type-
treatment pairs some of these pairs may  be uninformative. For example, if someone has a high information level ex ante (type
H) then they will learn no new information when given the low treatment. Alternatively, if someone has a low information
level ex ante (type L) then they could learn new information when given the high treatment and subsequently have any
ex post information level (L, M,  or H). We,  therefore, restrict ex ante H information types to receive only H information
treatments and ex ante M information types to receive only M and H treatments to maximize the power of the experiment
and focus on the effect of additional information.
After the quiz and the information treatments as stated above, subjects were all given identical background information
about the ﬂooding issue and coastal wetland creation project, the location of the ﬂoodplain and prospective new wetland,
the possible ﬂood mitigation beneﬁts and the potential cost of the policy. At this point, all agents were asked to select their
maximum WTP  for the good. Finally, each agent was  given the exact same quiz as at the beginning of the survey. Thus, at the
end of the survey each respondent in a treated group is summarized by an initial set of quiz answers (a priori information
set), a type-treatment pair, a treatment information set (bullet points), a WTP  response, and a second set of quiz answers
(ex post information set).
An important contribution of our paper is that the experimental design provides us with the opportunity to verify that
information is actually learned. One cost of this design, though, is that we must give subjects a quiz before eliciting WTP.
Taking a quiz is admittedly uncommon for subjects before valuing a good. This external validity concern, though, is the cost
of cleanly verifying that information provided was indeed learned. Furthermore, the external validity concern is only valid
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f taking a pre-survey quiz fundamentally alters the role of information and knowledge in a survey. We  view this as possible
ut unlikely.
From an experimental design perspective, we chose not to incentivize learning by paying subjects for answering correctly,
n order to mimic  common practice in stated preference studies as closely as possible. This decision provides external
alidity within the stated preference literature where best practices say nothing about incentivizing learning, nor how
ncentivizing learning might impact stated WTP  (Johnston et al., 2017). We are not concerned with experimenter demand
ffects because (save the pre-survey quiz discussed above) the survey mimics best practices for a payment card survey.
inally, in the econometric analysis, we intentionally weight each question equally in order to align the empirical design
ith the research question of identifying how the quantity of information in the survey impacts WTP  measures, conditional
n ex ante knowledge levels. We  are interested in learning about both how people use the amount of learned knowledge
n stated preference surveys and in how economists can improve on survey design. Given that common practice is to give
urvey subjects a wide variety of information about the attributes of the good being valued, equal weighting provides the
ppropriate counterfactual.
.3. Hypotheses
Combining the initial quiz, the information treatments and second quiz allows us to test for how subjects learn and
hat information processing procedure they are using in forming their valuation of a good. This subsection shows how our
esign allows us to compare different models of preference formation in stated preference surveys. Appendix A provides a
ore detailed discussion about how the hypotheses ﬁt into the literature on behavioral economics as discussed in the ﬁrst
aragraph of the introduction.
To identify how knowledge is created, its effect on preferences, and to parse between different models of preference
ormation, we estimate the following two equations separately deﬁning treatment coefﬁcients to convey the marginal
mpact of treatment on each outcome of interest:
Q2 Scorei = X
′
i  + 1
{
LLi, LMi, LHi
}
LL + 1
{
LMi, LHi
}
LM + 1
{
LHi
}
LH + 1
{
MMi, MHi
}
MM
+ 1
{
MHi
}
MH + 1
{
HHi
}
HH + εi (1)
WTPi = X
′
i  + 1
{
LLi, LMi, LHi
}
ωLL + 1
{
LMi, LHi
}
ωLM + 1
{
LHi
}
ωLH + 1
{
MMi, MHi
}
ωMM +
1
{
MHi
}
ωMH + 1
{
HHi
}
ωHH + εi (2)
Eqs. (1) and (2) include a vector X of self-reported subject speciﬁc demographic characteristics.3 In Eqs. (1) and (2), as
efore, the capital letter pairs (e.g. LH) stand for the ex ante score and the information treatment respectively (e.g., the
reatments in Table 2). There are two left-hand side variables which we consider separately but in both cases, we  leverage
xperimental variation in treatment and use a simple OLS econometric model. Due to clean, experimental variation, OLS is
ufﬁcient to describe the causal effect of treatment on our outcomes of interest, although we corroborate our results using
arametric estimation of WTP  distributions.
The ﬁrst LHS variable considered is Q2 score; it is the score respondents achieve in the second quiz they complete, and
hus measures ex post knowledge of the good. The Q2 score speciﬁcation measures actual learning that occurs conditional on
x ante information levels and treatment. Each coefﬁcient JN measures the marginal effect of being treated with additional
nformation on second quiz scores for subjects who  are in ex ante information knowledge group J when being in the N
nformation treatment. For example, LH is the marginal effect on second quiz scores of being presented with three additional
nformation bullet points relative to being presented with the M information treatment but being in the L ex ante knowledge
roup. This provides the right apples to apples comparison across treatments.
The second equation is deﬁned similarly with stated WTP  (WTP)4 conditional on ex ante information levels and treatment.
or example, ωLH is the marginal impact of being supplied with three additional objective information points on a subject’s
tated valuation relative to receiving the M information treatment (e.g., nine versus six total bullet points).We estimate both regressions by OLS with robust standard errors. We  also estimated the equations using interval regres-
ions and ﬁtted both a normal and spike distribution to the WTP  data to estimate both the mean and variance of treatment’s
mpact on WTP. Since results are consistent across these speciﬁcations we focus here on the OLS estimates, as our primary
3 In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation controls act to verify that assignment is random. Put another way, the average effect of additional information on scores (e.g.,
he  various treatment effects) should not be affected by demographic control variables. Conversely, when estimating the effect of WTP  on the controls,
t  could be the case that the effect of additional information on WTP  could vary systematically with demographic characteristics. If those demographic
haracteristics are also correlated with preferences for the good, then adding in controls could affect the estimated coefﬁcients of treatment on WTP.
4 In what follows, we  adopt a simple, non-parametric approach to estimating respondents’ WTP. We conservatively assume that their WTP  is equal to
he  lower bound of the selected payment card interval (i.e., we  use Kaplan-Meier estimator of WTP). Neither using mid-points of the selected intervals, nor
dopting parametric approach to estimating sample-level WTP  (presented towards the end of the paper) qualitatively changes the results.
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interest is the marginal impact of information on knowledge and of knowledge on WTP, rather than on WTP  levels per se.
OLS is the simplest method to construct this conditional different of means.
For all of our analysis, the correct control group for any treated group to identify the causal impact of information on
preferences conditional on a particular ex ante information must be subjects with the same level of ex ante information.
For example, the proper control group for a subject in the LH treatment is a subject in the LL treatment. Both subjects test
into a speciﬁc amount of ex ante knowledge (e.g., L) but are randomly assigned information treatments H versus L (e.g., nine
pieces of information versus three). As a result, LH types are identical to LL types in every way with respect to the amount
of ex ante knowledge as it relates to the quiz except for LH types being exposed to six “unknown” pieces of information.
The same logic holds for types LM versus LL. Comparing LM to LH compares six versus three unknown pieces of information
conditional on ex ante L information levels. Comparing MH  to MM compares three new pieces of information conditional on
M ex ante information levels.5 As a result, the correct counterfactual for any comparison are subjects with the same level of
ex ante information but different information treatments. To this end, comparing ex ante L types to ex ante M types is not
the main comparative static of interest since those subjects have different levels of ex ante information (e.g., the average
number of correct answers in L versus M is two  versus ﬁve).
By jointly analyzing the coefﬁcient estimates of Eqs. (1) and (2) we can evaluate whether the results of our experiment is
consistent or not with different models of learning and preference formation. For example, estimating LM = LH = 0, MH = 0
jointly with ω LM = 0, ω LH = 0, ω MH = 0 implies that we fail to reject the null hypotheses that no learning and no preference
updating takes place. Alternatively, estimating LL + LM = MM, LL + LM + LH = MM +MH = HH and ω LL + ω LM + ω LH
= ω MM + ω MH = ω HH, ω LL + ω LM = ω MM means that we fail to reject a null hypothesis of complete learning and valuation
updating fully dependent on attribute information. See Appendix B for a mapping of coefﬁcient estimates to alternative
models of learning.
3. Results
Table 3 shows the distribution of Type –Treatment pairs in our sample. Twelve subjects scored 7, 8 or 9 on the ﬁrst quiz.
As a result, there are only twelve a priori type H subjects meaning there are only twelve subjects in the HH treatment. We
oversampled from the LL type-treatment group in order to balance the power in estimating treatment effect relative to the
information treatments most commonly found in the ﬁeld (e.g., type L ex ante).
Table 3 also reports socio-demographic characteristics by treatment type. Comparing the characteristics of the local
authority populations to our sample revealed our sample was  not fully representative. The age groups 40–49 years, 50–59
years and 65 and over were well-represented in the survey whilst the youngest age group (18–29) was under represented (9%
of the sample compared to 22% in population). Males were also over represented in the survey (58% compared to 47%). 63%
of respondents worked full time compared to 50% of the overall population. The modal income group was  £20,000–£39,000
which was similar to the median income of the local authorities (£26,000). Over 80% of the sample owned their own homes
compared to local authority average of 64%. This would have implications for calculating the aggregate WTP  for the managed
realignment scheme and appropriate weightings would need to be applied.
3.1. Treatment and learning
Comparing the ﬁrst and second quiz scores it is clear that subjects scored signiﬁcantly better on the second quiz compared
to the ﬁrst quiz (mean score for quiz one = 3.05, S.E = 0.08 and mean score for quiz two  = 4.86, S.E = 0.10) (Fig. 1). This is evidence
that respondents were less informed about the good and the project before the survey relative to after.
Fig. 2 compares total correct, incorrect and “I don’t know” responses across the ﬁrst and second quizzes. There is little dif-
ference between the incorrect responses between the two  quiz rounds, however, the proportion of “I don’t know” responses
falls signiﬁcantly between the two rounds. This suggests that people who  were unsure in Round 1 were those who  read
the new information more carefully and learned this new information. Those who guessed incorrectly but were not told
they had guessed incorrectly perhaps did not engage with the new information provided. For the remainder of the analysis
“I don’t know responses” were treated as “incorrect responses”, however, we  are interested in the information learned by
respondents as judged by the increased quiz score, not the difference between incorrect and I don’t know respondents.
Table 4 shows the coefﬁcient estimates of regression (1) with Second Quiz Score as the dependent variable and information
treatment groups as independent variables. LL, MM and HH are deﬁned as mean quiz 2 scores and LM,  LH, and MH  deﬁned as
the marginal impact of additional information on the second quiz score. To highlight treatment effects, we exclude a constant
in this regression speciﬁcation.6 We  report four speciﬁcations: the full sample with and without self- reported demographic
controls including survey round, education, gender, ﬂood threat indicators, property owner, and environmentalist and only
5 The design permits some ex ante heterogeneity within Type-Treatment pairs. For example a subject in LL could view zero, one, two or three new pieces
of  information. On average, though, subjects in the LM group will see more. We show this explicitly below. Average differences preserve internally valid
experimental design. Having treatment groups deﬁned as the number of correct answers was not feasible given our sample size.
6 As before, some observations are dropped when control variables are included since some subjects chose to not respond to questions about where they
lived  and their level of education.
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Table  3
Socio-demographic comparisons between the type-treatment pairs.
Type - Treatment Pairs
LL LM LH MM MH HH
Income
Under £15,000 18% 16% 2% 16% 11% 22%
£15,000–£19,999 13% 13% 13% 12% 14% 0%
£20,000–£39,999 24% 23% 38% 41% 41% 33%
£40,000–£69,999 27% 26% 33% 20% 20% 33%
£70,000–£99,999 10% 11% 7% 9% 9% 11%
Over  £100,000 8% 10% 7% 2% 5% 0%
Education
Secondary school 24% 23% 15% 20% 19% 22%
Sixth  form/college 24% 18% 26% 26% 25% 11%
Undergraduate degree 22% 29% 34% 28% 29% 11%
Post-graduate degree 29% 30% 26% 26% 27% 56%
Economic activity
Employed 58% 70% 73% 59% 69% 40%
Unemployed 42% 30% 27% 41% 31% 60%
Property status
Property owner 76% 79% 84% 89% 87% 90%
Other  24% 21% 16% 11% 13% 10%
Gender
Female  46% 34% 35% 43% 42% 60%
Male  54% 66% 65% 57% 58% 40%
Age
18–29  8% 11% 16% 6% 11% 10%
30–39  17% 18% 24% 9% 11% 0%
40–49  16% 18% 23% 22% 19% 10%
50–59  26% 24% 16% 25% 26% 30%
60–64 8% 9% 10% 13% 8% 10%
65  and over 26% 20% 11% 25% 25% 40%
Observations 151 78 72 97 94 12
Note: Socio-demographic information by treatment status. Not all subjects in each Type-Treatment pair answered all socio-demographic questions. We
investigate this in detail below.
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t
iFig. 1. Comparison of the ﬁrst and second quiz scores.
ndividuals who self-reported perceiving their responses as being consequential to the likelihood of the managed realignment
cheme taking place, again with and without controls. In each speciﬁcation, the control variables do not signiﬁcantly alter
he estimated treatment effects. We  take this as evidence that we properly randomized treatment.7Table 4 has two key features. First, for every speciﬁcation, providing more information to subjects increases retained
nformation (knowledge). Some of these increases, though, are not statistically signiﬁcant. Second, the rate of informa-
7 Balancing tables available upon request conﬁrm we randomized properly.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of correct, incorrect and I don’t know responses for quiz rounds 1 and 2.
Table 4
Regression of the second quiz score on type-treatment pairs.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
LL 3.53*** 4.07*** 3.43*** 5.15***
(0.06) (0.46) (0.10) (0.56)
LM  0.95* 1.30*** 1.10* 1.32**
(0.44) (0.13) (0.48) (0.29)
LH  0.44 0.56 0.038 0.26
(0.32) (0.28) (0.475) (0.39)
MM  5.40*** 6.06*** 5.13*** 6.72***
(0.15) (0.51) (0.24) (0.77)
MH  0.88*** 0.91*** 1.00*** 1.08***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.157) (0.18)
HH  8.17*** 8.62*** 8.14*** 9.42***
(0.21) (0.11) (0.25) (0.28)
Observations 504 431 247 179
Controls N Y N Y
Consequential Sample Only N N Y Y
R-squared 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.92
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * represent signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Dependent Variable is second quiz score. LM,  LH and
MH  are deﬁned as the marginal effect of additional information. Control variables in columns (2) and (4) are survey round, education, gender, ﬂood threat
indicators, property owner, and environmentalist. Columns (3) and (4) include only individuals who did not perceive results as being inconsequential. To
highlight treatment effects, we exclude a constant in this regression speciﬁcation.
tion retention varies somewhat across speciﬁcations. However, the pattern of decreasing retention as more information is
provided (e.g., LH coefﬁcient smaller than LM coefﬁcient) is consistent across speciﬁcations.
Turning to the hypothesis tests for learning, we  can reject the hypothesis that no learning occurs. In each speciﬁcation, the
estimated coefﬁcients on LM and MH are signiﬁcantly different from zero. Similarly, we can reject the null hypothesis that
subjects exhibit complete retention: the coefﬁcient on LH is not statistically different from zero. Further, the point estimates
for the coefﬁcient on LM and MH  indicate that subjects retain between 1 and 1.3 pieces of information for each three new
pieces of information given for “low levels” of new information (e.g., three new pieces) but only 0.04 to 0.56 pieces out of
three for “high levels” of new information.
As a result, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of incomplete learning and fatigue. The marginal ability of subjects to
learn new information is clearly decreasing in the volume of new information provided in every speciﬁcation. It is also clear
from the coefﬁcients on LL, LM and LH that information monotonically increases scores (similarly for MM and MH). We take
this as evidence that our information treatments cause subjects to learn, but that learning is incomplete.
3.2. Willingness to pay effect
Table 5 shows summary statistics for WTP  levels by treatment status. 83% of the sample were willing to pay towards
the managed realignment scheme with a sample mean WTP  of £44.77 per annum (S.D = 46.21). The main reasons for not
being prepared to pay were not being able to afford to contribute (26%) and belief that it is the Scottish Government’s
responsibility to fund ﬂood defense (27%). Other potential reasons for not being willing to pay were i) respondents not
believing that managed realignment is an effective ﬂood defense ii) respondents not believing there is a need to invest in
ﬂood defenses and iii) respondents preferring to spend their income on other things
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Table  5
Comparison of WTP  across the type-treatment pairs.
Type - Treatment Pairs Percent of Zero Bids Median WTP  Mean WTP  Standard Deviation Observations
LL 19% 20 45.17 48.12 151
LM  14% 45 51.47 48.51 78
LH  19% 20 42.01 46.52 72
MM  19% 20 37.99 39.67 97
MH  13% 30 47.66 48.51 94
HH  0% 45 45.00 34.18 12
Total  17% 30 44.77 46.21 504
Note: Includes all completed surveys.
Table 6
Regression of WTP  (mid-points of selected interval ranges) on type-treatment pairs.
Type - Treatment Pairs (1) (2) (3) (4)
LL 45.17*** 67.82*** 58.33*** 64.17***
(4.77) (3.75) (4.79) (6.776)
LM  6.31 −3.37 0.17 −9.24
(6.04) (6.99) (8.53) (8.72)
LH  −9.46** −10.55*** −2.72 −5.92
(2.26) (2.14) (8.17) (8.49)
MM  37.99*** 57.22*** 36.89** 37.08***
(7.17) (3.24) (10.63) (5.84)
MH  9.67 7.59 13.21 7.81
(8.14) (5.05) (14.53) (11.35)
HH  45.00** 59.65* 37.14* 24.03
(12.51) (21.69) (16.17) (13.82)
Observations 504 431 247 179
Controls N Y N Y
Consequential Sample Only N N Y Y
R-squared 0.49 0.627 0.547 0.72
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * represent signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Dependent Variable is stated valuation. LM,  LH and
MH  are deﬁned as the marginal effect of additional information. Control variables in columns (2) and (4) are survey round, education, gender, ﬂood threat
indicators, property owner, and environmentalist. Columns (3) and (4) include only individuals who did not perceive results as being inconsequential.
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aTable 6 shows the coefﬁcient estimates of regression (2) with WTP  as the dependent variable and treatment group as
ndependent variables. We  report four speciﬁcations: the full sample with and without controls and the subset of subjects
elf-reporting their responses as being consequential with and without controls. In all cases, demographic controls have
he expected sign. For example, environmental group members and respondents who were most concerned about ﬂooding
ere willing to pay more for the managed realignment scheme. Including the demographic controls does not signiﬁcantly
lter the effects of the treatment groups on WTP. We  henceforth leave out any discussion of demographic controls to focus
ttention on treatment effects.
There are three aspects of Table 6. First, there are some differences in stated valuations according to whether subjects said
hat they believed the survey would be used for policy decisions or not (that is, whether they believed their responses would
e outcome-consequential). In some cases, there are level differences (e.g., the MM and LH coefﬁcients in speciﬁcations (2)
nd (4)). In most cases the standard errors increase as well (e.g., LL standard error in (2) versus (4)). Consistent with previous
eld studies on consequentiality we ﬁnd evidence that beliefs about consequentiality are positively correlated with stated
TP (Herriges et al., 2010; Hwang et al., 2014; Interis and Petrolia, 2014; Vossler et al., 2012; Vossler and Watson, 2013;
zajkowski et al., 2017).
Second, the mean WTP  varies by ex-ante levels of information. For example, people in the LL group had signiﬁcantly
igher valuations than those in the MM group (p-value for signiﬁcant difference in speciﬁcation 4 less than 0.01). Similarly,
e reject the null hypothesis that ω LL + ω LM = ω MM at 5% and 10% levels for speciﬁcations (3) and (4). We  fail to reject the
igh information analog though (e.g., fail to reject H0: ω LL + ω LM + ω LH = ω MM + ω MH = ω HH. While we fail to reject the full
nformation hypothesis, this is possibly due to imprecise estimates. This result is consistent with the literature that ex ante
nformation and experience levels with a good are correlated with WTP  (Cameron and Englin, 1997; Loomis and Ekstrand,
998; Tkac, 1998).
Third, the marginal effects of information on stated WTP, which we conﬁrmed becomes knowledge at imperfect but
tatistically signiﬁcant positive rates is not statistically different from zero in every speciﬁcation. The one exception is that
here is a signiﬁcant and negative marginal effect of the three pieces of information in the LH treatment which we  verify
bove were not learned for speciﬁcations (1) and (2). This result implies large amounts of unlearned information lead to lower
80 K. Needham et al. / Resource and Energy Economics 54 (2018) 69–89Fig. 3. A: New information learned versus new information shown i.e. opportunity to learn. The average number of new bullets show is 3.11, the average
number learned is 1.38. n = 482. B: New information learned and maximum willingness to pay. Mean retention rate by treatment: LL = 0.51, LM = 0.55,
LH  = 0.50, MM = 0.54, MH = 0.54, HH = 0.63. n = 482.
stated WTP. It could be that subjects take the additional information as evidence they are not informed and that uncertainty
about the accuracy of their information set affects valuations, similar to LaRiviere et al. (2014)8.
3.3. Learning and willingness to pay
Lastly, our experimental design gives us the ability to test for the causal effect of learning on WTP  directly. We  are not
aware of another study which has this feature. Because we observe what a subject knew before the treatment, exogenously
provide information, elicit WTP  and then observe what the subject knew ex post, we  can both observe learning and then
relate observed learning to observed differences in stated WTP. The normal confounding factor in this analysis is that subjects
who knew less to begin with have a greater opportunity to learn. However, we  can control for the number of new pieces of
information each subject sees. Due to our experimental design, then, we can get around this problem.
Fig. 3 shows the correlation between exposure to new information and learning new information and the correlation
between learning new information and WTP  in panels (a) and (b) respectively. We deﬁne a variable called New Information
Shown which is deﬁned as the number of new pieces of objective information shown to a subject. For example, if a subject
answered four questions correctly on the ﬁrst quiz and was assigned to the M information treatment, they would be exposed
to two new pieces of information. We  also deﬁne a variable called New Information Learned which is deﬁned as the number
of new pieces of information which the subject learned. Put another way, New Information Learned is the number of correctly
answered questions on the second quiz which the subject both didn’t correctly answer on the ﬁrst quiz and which was
subsequently provided in an information bullet. This lets us be certain that on average subjects learned the bullet point due
to the information presented as opposed to guessing the correct answer on the second quiz randomly. Hence, Info Bullets
Learned is less than or equal to New Information Shown by deﬁnition. Lastly, the ratio of New Information Learned to New
Information Shown we call the “retention ratio”.Panel (a) conﬁrms the ﬁndings regarding learning and updating: despite a couple of subjects who are outliers there is
a clear positive relationship between being treated with new information and learning. The relationship, though, between
WTP and learning is less clear. If anything, it appears there is a negative relationship between learning and WTP. However,
8 We note, though, that, our study on the coefﬁcient estimate on LH concerns the marginal effect of knowledge on preferences, not the strength of
preference or the valuations associated with them. To that end, the coefﬁcient on LH estimates the marginal impact of additional information on stated
valuation. Issues raised by lack of consequentiality are differenced out by the LL coefﬁcient in our study.
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anel (b) does not control for ex ante information levels: for example, the subjects who  learn more information could more
ikely to have less ex ante information as well. Our analysis controls for this artefact breaking the marginal effect of learned
nformation into ex ante level of information bins.
.4. Parametric estimation of willingness to pay
While there is no evidence in our experiment that treatment affected mean valuations, it is possible that treatment could
ave affected the variance of the distribution of valuations. Czajkowski et al. (2015a,b) show that in both Bayesian and
on-Bayesian models of updating, additional knowledge about a good can affect the variance in addition to the mean of
TP  distribution. In either a Bayesian or non-Bayesian model, more information serves to move agents closer to their fully
nformed valuations, even though is some models like costly attention or conﬁrmatory bias, agents are less likely change
hese valuations.
We  perform a joint test of treatment on the variance and mean of the WTP  distribution.9 Consistent with our OLS ﬁndings,
e do not ﬁnd an effect of additional information on mean WTP  and there is no impact of additional information on the
ariance of WTP. This result is somewhat surprising: even though additional information does not impact mean WTP, a
odel of Bayesian updating suggests that additional information should tighten the distribution around an (unchanging)
ean (Czajkowski et al., 2015a,b). Even if type L or M subjects update around an unbiased (albeit imperfectly informed)
ean WTP, this ﬁnding is inconsistent with a model of heterogeneous preferences with Bayesian updating and costly search.
s we discuss in the next section, it is also not a smoking gun for any non-Bayesian updating model. While a puzzle, we urge
aution as this is a single study’s result.10 Replication in other contexts is needed.
. Discussion and conclusion
This paper reports the results of a novel experiment to identify the causal effect of learning and knowledge about an
nvironmental good on how people value that good. We  designed an experiment which identiﬁes ex ante knowledge levels,
xogenously varies information provided to subjects, elicits valuations for the good using stated preference methods, and
nally identiﬁes ex post knowledge levels. The results for learning show that providing subjects with more new information
auses signiﬁcantly more learning. However, we ﬁnd that observed learning is incomplete. We  also ﬁnd the likelihood that a
ubject learns a piece of new information decreases as the subject is presented with increasing amounts of new information,
 result which is consistent with models of fatigue. Our ﬁndings, therefore, suggest that learning is imperfect and varies with
he amount of new information presented. There is, however, an endogeneity concern: if a subject cares more about the topic
t could be that they are willing to use more effort in order to retain the additional information provided. This was tested for
y including personal relevance and motivation variables when regressing type-treatment pairs on the second quiz score.
lood risk characteristics were not signiﬁcant, which suggests there was  no relationship between personal motivation and
earning.
The results of the valuation portion of the experiment show that exogenous increases in knowledge about the good’s
ttributes (both increased ﬂood protection and increased wildlife abundance) did not alter subjects’ valuation for the good;
ur evidence is thus consistent with an absence of knowledge-based preference formation within a survey. Information
earned also has no signiﬁcant effect on the variance of stated WTP. Ex ante knowledge, however, matters a great deal to the
alue people placed on the wetlands project.
The learning results, coupled with the valuation results, are consistent with three different models of updating and
reference formation: one consistent with neutral information processing and two  which depart from the neoclassical
odel. The ﬁrst possible model is a neoclassical model of costly search similar in spirit to Caplin et al. (2011): agents use
ostly effort to seek out and learn information up to the point where the expected marginal cost of learning is equal to the
xpected marginal beneﬁt11. If endogenously acquired knowledge about “good” attributes is valued according to underlying
eterogeneous preferences, the provision of additional knowledge will not affect pre-existing valuation levels. Furthermore,
x ante levels of knowledge could easily correlate with valuations in a systematic way: for example, people in the ﬂoodplain
ay  both know more about the ﬂood mitigation potential of wetlands and be willing to pay more for wetland restoration.
his type of model also bears some similarities to other recent behavioral models of costly attention (Caplin et al., 2011;
anna et al., 2014; Schwartzstein, 2014).
Second, our results are consistent with imperfect learning coupled with conﬁrmation bias similar to Rabin and Schrag
1999). Importantly, this interpretation requires that we  tested for both learning and changes in valuations. Without verifying
9 Full discussion the analysis and table of results can be found in Appendix B.
10 A study with the same design but with a choice experiment (CE) elicitation format would be better suited to address that question. A payment card
nly  offers a single observation per subject whereas a CE allows for a multiple observations between subjects. As a result, a CE format is better suited to
stimate the marginal impact of knowledge on preferences across subjects in different treatments (e.g., the scale parameter). This is an intriguing line of
uture  research.
11 Our results are somewhat different in that we study information gathering rather than choice sets.
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that learning occurs- even incomplete learning- it is possible that subjects have no opportunity to update valuations because
the differing levels of information embedded in different information treatments were not actually learned12.
Third, it could be that learning can occur instantaneously but preference formation takes time. Given that our experiment
takes place over 10–25 min, we are not able to identify any changes in valuation which may  take longer to evolve. While
we are not aware of any models of preference formation with this dual timing feature, it is one possible explanation for our
ﬁndings. Further, from a stated preference survey design perspective, the 10–25 min  time interval is the relevant one.
A drawback of this research was not including a question on preference uncertainty following the WTP  question. Loomis
and Ekstrand (1998) demonstrated in their work on owl conservation that respondents with a higher prior knowledge of
the good were more certain about their preferences. A useful addition to this survey would have been to explore whether
preference uncertainty was inﬂuenced by respondents’ prior knowledge or the additional information presented to them.
Furthermore, allowing respondents more variability in the payment card format i.e. being able to tick the amounts they are
certain they would pay and being allowed to leave a gap between that and the amounts they certainly would not pay, as
used by Hanley et al., (2009) may  have also shown differences between the type-treatment groups.
We recognize that a nine-question multiple choice quiz is an imperfect measure of knowledge. There are two  issues:
one that the test is multiple choice and the other that it is only nine questions. However, almost all OECD countries use
multiple choice questions to test students’ knowledge of use. The SAT is the most important single test for college placement
in the U.S. and is almost entirely multiple choice. Economics faculties also often use multiple choice tests to evaluate student
knowledge. Another issue is that the length of the multiple choice quiz is too short. Here we rely on the law of large numbers:
on average less informed subjects will perform worse on a multiple choice quiz than more informed subjects. Because we
give the test to over 500 subjects, on average the people that perform well on the test know more and the people that
perform worse know less. While one individual might get lucky, we have a sufﬁciently large sample size so that on average
L types know less about the information the quiz than M types who know less than H types. Put another way, a single low
knowledge type who is classiﬁed as an M due to luck will wash out on average. As further evidence that types are not random,
L types learn more when given the H treatment relative to the M treatment relative to the L treatment. In sum, because of
the widespread use of multiple-choice tests in education, the law of large numbers and the statistically signiﬁcant evidence
that subjects in different ex ante groups learn relatively more when given additional information, we  are conﬁdent in the
validity of using a nine-question multiple choice quiz to get signal on knowledge levels.
A further limitation of our survey could be the high proportion of respondents supporting the proposal (83%). Flooding
and ﬂood risk is an emotive issue, and as the results show a high number of respondents supported the scheme. This raises
the question as to whether our ﬁndings would be valid for a less preferred or less familiar good. Respondents who were
most concerned about whether their home or local area would be protected were likely to be solely interested in the ﬂood
reduction beneﬁts of the good (information on which was presented to all respondents in the standard elicitation scenario)
and chose to ignore additional information on ecosystem service provision when forming/stating their preferences. This
may  not be the case for a more unfamiliar or less well received good.
The fact that the new information provided to respondents in our survey did not affect the mean or the variance of the
WTP  distribution could have implications for stated preference instrument design if the results are shown to be externally
valid. We  ﬁnd that respondents’ ex ante (pre-survey) level of knowledge affects the value they place on the environmental
good. Respondents learn some of the information provided to them, but the marginal effects of this information are declining.
In line with more general work in economics, our results imply that survey respondents in our study could exhibit some of
the same “behavioral” updating rules recently discussed in the literature. Similar mechanisms developed to address these
issues in revealed preference markets might be useful in stated preference markets as well if the results from this single
study are externally valid. In that sense, we view this paper as one of many linking behavioral updating and preference
formation models to stated preference surveys.
However, we urge some caution in interpreting our ﬁndings, as further research is needed to identify their robustness
and transferability within stated preferences. The external validity of our ﬁndings outside of a stated preference context is
also uncertain. It is possible that in relatively low stakes micro level decisions, economic actors deviate from decision rules
used in other circumstances. Decisions made with higher stakes and by experienced decision makers should, therefore,
be evaluated as well. Further, more experimental designs are needed to parse between alternative models of learning,
preference formation and value updating which we  sketch in this paper.
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Table  A1
Ex ante information and ex post information levels. Importantly, the cells in this table do not necessarily correspond to any particular treatment. This table
represents all possible scenarios, assuming perfect recall, for how much information a subject can have after treatment assuming that each updating rule
is  feasible.
Ex Ante Information
Ex Post Information L M H
A
c
w
o
A
n
h
k
i
a
e
h
1
2
3
f
t
4
j
t
A
d
mHinfo LH MH HH
Minfo LM MM —
Linfo LL — —
ppendix A. Alternative models of updating
In this paper we are able to horserace several different learning and preference formation: we list possible ﬁndings as
onsistent or inconsistent with different models. If we reject a null hypothesis, we,  therefore, reject the model associated
ith it. Alternatively, if we fail to reject a null hypothesis, our ﬁndings are consistent with that particular model of learning
r preference formation (insofar as preferences are related to valuations).
.1 Learning hypotheses
One way to think about the causal effect of information on knowledge is from estimating Eq. (A1).
Q2 Scorei = X
′
i  + 1
{
LLi, LMi, LHi
}
LL + 1
{
LMi, LHi
}
LM + 1
{
LHi
}
LH + 1
{
MMi, MHi
}
MM +
1
{
MHi
}
MH + 1
{
HHi
}
HH + εi (A1)
Table A1 highlights the possible ex ante and ex post information levels. First, there are three information pairs that are
ot feasible because we did not use redundant treatments: ML,  HL and HM.  For example, an individual with an ex ante
igh information set should never lose information because they are reminded of a subset of information they already
new. Second, there are three information pairs in which minimal or no learning occurs: LL, MM and HH. The effect of these
nformation pairings on learning (e.g., the ﬁrst equation) is the increase in score given by the estimated coefﬁcients LL, MM,
nd HH. Third, there are three information pairings in which some learning might occur: LM,  LH and MH.  The marginal
ffect of new information on the score is given by LM, LH, and MH.
Now consider the signiﬁcance of coefﬁcients which would be consistent with different types of learning. We  are able to
orserace three different models of learning.
) No Learning – H0: LM = LH = 0, MH = 0
In this case, only a priori information determines subsequent second quiz scores.
) Complete Learning –H0: LL + LM = MM, LL + LM + LH = MM +MH = HH
In this case, the information treatment fully determines ex post information levels.
) Incomplete Learning– H0: LM >0, LH >0, MH >0
In this case, type L individuals cannot fully learn in the high information treatment. In addition, subjects could exhibit
atigue when they learn. For example, the ability of subjects to retain the marginal piece of information could decrease in
he amount of information they are provided with.
) Fatigue - H0: LH < LM
In the case of fatigue, retention rates are higher when the subject is provided with less information. Note that fatigue can
ointly occur with incomplete learning. Further, fatigue could be a cause of incomplete learning if, for example, subjects in
he LH and LM information treatments do not have signiﬁcantly different levels of ex post knowledge.
.2 Preference formation/valuation hypothesesConditional on learning, there is still a question of how new knowledge about the good’s attributes affects WTP. Our
esign and the empirical speciﬁcation in Eq. (2) allows us to control for ex ante attribute knowledge levels so that the
arginal effect of knowledge can vary as a function of ex ante knowledge levels. This is what distinguishes learning and
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preference formation in our study. For example, it is not necessarily the case that the two individuals that have the same
amount of retained information after treatment have the same WTP  for the good. Given the design of this experiment, we
can horserace different models of how additional information affects WTP. To do so, we consider the models below that use
the valuation estimating Eq. (A2). In order to interpret each model, there are restrictions on the learning results which must
coincide with the valuation based preference results.
WTPi = X
′
i  + 1
{
LLi, LMi, LHi
}
ωLL + 1
{
LMi, LHi
}
ωLM + 1
{
LHi
}
ωLH + 1
{
MMi, MHi
}
ωMM
+ 1
{
MHi
}
ωMH + 1
{
HHi
}
ωHH + εi (A2)
1) Knowledge-based preference updating – H0: ω LM /= 0, ω LH /= 0, ω MH /= 0
Knowledge-based preference updating implies that subjects’ WTP  is determined by the ex post knowledge levels of
knowledge. In order for this result to be consistent with knowledge-based rather than information-based updating, though,
this ﬁnding must coincide with either complete or incomplete learning. If instead, this empirical result occurs jointly with no
learning then this empirical ﬁnding would be consistent with information-based preference updating rather than knowledge-
based valuation updating.
It is possible that different types of knowledge-based preference updating are more informative, from a scientiﬁc per-
spective, than others. Consider the following:
2) Ex-post knowledge preference updating–
H0:ωLL+ωLM+ωLH=ωMM+ωMH=ωHH,ωLL+ωLM=ωMM
Ex-post knowledge preference updating implies that only ex post knowledge levels correlate with valuation and ex ante
levels do not. It is consistent with knowledge about good attributes having a uniform effect (e.g., prior knowledge levels
don’t matter, only knowledge levels at the time of WTP  elicitation).
3) Ex ante Knowledge-based preferences– H0: ω LM = ω LH = 0, ω MH = 0
If learning occurs but valuations do not change as a function of new knowledge then valuations are not a function of ex
post information levels. In this case, the endogenous acquisition of ex ante knowledge before the experiment fully dictates
the WTP  of agents. There are three different models consistent with this result.
First, agents could interpret learned information as conﬁrming what they already understood regarding their preferences
for the good, consistent with conﬁrmatory bias as in Rabin and Schrag (1999). As a result, conﬁrmation bias is joint hypotheses
across both the learning regressions (e.g., there must be either complete or incomplete learning) and the results of the
conﬁrmation bias coefﬁcients above.
Second, agents could use endogenously chosen levels of costly effort before the experiment to learn up to the point where
the marginal cost of learning is less than the expected marginal beneﬁt (e.g., learning increases welfare from a decrease
in decision errors). If these endogenously acquired priors are unbiased relative to underlying heterogeneous preferences,
additional information will not affect pre-existing valuation levels. This model bears similarity to bandit models of costly
search where heterogeneous preferences create variation in the marginal beneﬁt of obtaining knowledge (Caplin et al.,
2011).
Third, this result is also consistent with a timing gap between learning and preference formation. It could be that subjects
exhibit knowledge-based preference formation but preferences take time to form and are only formed upon reﬂection. We
are not aware of any economic model which posits that preferences are formed in this way but we cannot rule it out as
an explanation. We  are also not aware of any extant experimental design designed to parse between the ﬁrst two  models
although identifying this third model could conceivably be performed but eliciting valuations at different points in time.
There are two caveats to conﬁrmation bias and endogenous costly effort. First, nothing in principle prevents endogenous
costly effort and conﬁrmation bias from occurring simultaneously. Indeed separately identifying these two models could be
challenging to future researchers. Second, if endogenously acquired knowledge levels are correlated with preference then
we expect to observe: ω LL /= ω MM /= ω HH /= 0. For example, a consumer who has a higher WTP  to attend a tennis match
may know more about tennis, ceteris paribus.
1) No Knowledge-based preferences– H0: ω LL= ω MM = ω HH, ω LM= ω LH = ω MH = 0If learning occurs but knowledge is orthogonal to preferences then there would be no statistically signiﬁcant difference
between ex ante levels of information, ex post levels of information and value for the good. This ﬁnding would indicate that
other factors rather than knowledge of the good’s attributes drives heterogeneous preferences for goods.
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Table  A2
Comparison of different parametric distributions ﬁtted to the interval WTP  data.
Parameters LL AICc/n
Normal 2 −1582.89 6.33
Logistic 2 −1576.22 6.30
Extreme Value 2 −1682.91 6.73
Generalized Extreme Value 3 −1399.22 5.63
t  Location Scale 3 −1582.89 6.36
Uniform 2 −1579.70 6.32
Johnson SU 4 −1376.31 5.56
Expotential 1 −1372.33 5.47
Lognormal 2 −1378.31 5.52
Loglogistic 2 −1381.19 5.53
Weibull 2 −1356.27 5.43
Rayleigh 1 −1706.46 6.80
Gamma  2 −1354.35 5.42
Birnbaum-Saunders 2 −1373.11 5.50
Generalized Pareto 3 −1362.63 5.48
Inverse Gaussian 2 −1403.87 5.62
Nakagami 2 −1413.76 5.66
Rician  2 −1706.46 6.82
Johnson SB 4 −1370.03 5.54
Johnson SL 4 1376.31 5.48
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pPoisson 1 −10,033.66 39.84
Negative Binomial 2 −1376.12 5.51
) Knowledge based Preferences & Information Overload–
H0: LH = 0, LL+LM= MM, MM+MH= HH, MH /= 0, MH /= 0
Assuming that learning occurs and that ex post knowledge levels matter, there could be a distinct behavioral reaction to
eing given large amounts of new information in preference formation. Being treated with signiﬁcantly more information
han a subject already possesses as knowledge could feasibly affect preference formation directly. This has similarities
o a model of costly preference formation where more new knowledge leads to higher processing costs. If we observe
ull learning, and moderate amounts of knowledge matter for WTP  (e.g., ω LM /= 0, ω MH /= 0) but the marginal value of
nowledge decreases in the amount of knowledge (e.g., ω LH = 0) it is evidence that preference formation costs, if they exist,
ncrease in the amount of new knowledge.
We  perform a joint test of treatment on the variance and mean of the WTP  distribution. We use individual interval WTP
esponses to ﬁt several parametric distributions of WTP.13 We calculated the CDF of the selected distribution at the upper
ound of each individual’s WTP  and subtracted the CDF evaluated at the lower bound of their WTP.14 This is simply the
robability that the individual’s WTP  is in the range described by the lower and upper bound, indicated by the selected
id and the next highest bid (conditional on the parametric distribution sample-level parameters), and is this individual’s
ontribution to the likelihood function. By adding up the individual contributions and maximizing the resulting function with
espect to the distribution parameters, we effectively use the maximum likelihood method to ﬁt a parametric distribution
o our interval data.
Formally, let LBi and UBi indicate individual i’s lower and upper bounds of WTP, respectively. This individual contribution
o the likelihood function, conditional on an assumed parametric WTP  distribution described by a known CDF is:
Li = Pr (LBi ≥ WTPi > UBi) = CDF
(
UBi, ˇi
)
− CDF
(
LBi, ˇi
)
, (A1)
here ˇi is a vector of distribution parameters (e.g., mean and standard deviation for the normal distribution) which can be
ade individual-speciﬁc by making them functions of individual-speciﬁc characteristics.15
Because there is no a priori or theory driven-guidance on the shape of the distribution of WTP  in the population, we  tried
ver twenty most commonly used parametric distributions to see which one ﬁts our data best (Table A2) We found that,
f the distributions we tried, the gamma  distribution provided the best ﬁt, in terms of the lowest ﬁnite sample corrected
kaike Information Criterion level.16
13 Recall that the survey elicited respondents’ WTP  using the payment card approach. Respondents were asked to select the maximum bid which they
ould be willing to pay. This reveals that their WTP  is equal or higher than the selected bid and lower than the next higher bid (not selected), effectively
roviding the information about the interval in which respondents’ true WTP  is.
14 In the case the numerically calculated difference of the CDFs was 0, we  took the PDF of the distribution evaluated at the lower of the bounds.
15 The models were estimated using a custom code developed in Matlab, available from https://github.com/czaj/DistFit under CC BY 4.0 license.
16 We used AICc instead of comparing the LL values, because the distributions could differ in the number of parameters.
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Table A3
Treatment-speciﬁc estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the Gamma distributed WTP.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
LL 52.82*** 67.10*** 63.48** 74.92*** 67.66*** 77.96*** 137.54*** 76.16***
(5.89) (8.45) (25.38) (25.98) (11.25) (14.37) (50.95) (15.02)
LM  5.92 −0.19 −5.06 −3.21 −2.29 −9.51 −39.35 −15.33
(10.31) (13.83) (11.79) (7.68) (17.28) (20.56) (37.42) (11.17)
LH  −11.47 −5.67 −2.84 −1.97 −3.61 6.78 −6.41 −2.94
(11.71) (15.65) (11.49) (7.74) (20.23) (24.08) (5.68) (2.30)
MM  42.24*** 50.07*** 66.59** 77.22*** 40.00*** 47.61*** 87.22** 56.07***
(5.46) (7.20) (27.51) (26.97) (7.03) (8.89) (38.57) (15.38)
MH  13.63 16.24 14.31 9.31 16.79 14.91 10.68 5.30
(9.32) (12.46) (11.42) (7.10) (12.40) (15.09) (10.58) (4.55)
HH  42.69*** 35.42*** 76.36** 85.33*** 33.87** 33.93*** 167.23*** 82.37***
(12.97) (9.49) (36.51) (29.83) (14.33) (11.20) (51.48) (16.63)
Observations 504 432 247 179
Controls N Y N Y
Consequential Sample Only N N Y Y
AICc/n 5.42 5.29 5.59 5.44
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * represent signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. LM,  LH and MH are deﬁned as the marginal effect of addition
information. Control variables in columns (2) and (4) are survey round, education, gender, ﬂood threat indicators, property owner, and environmentalist.
Columns (3) and (4) include only individuals who did not perceive results as being inconsequential.
Table B1
IV regressions of WTP  on second quiz score (ex ante low knowledge).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quiz 2 Score −0.13 −2.78 −0.999 −6.68
(4.49) (3.82) (7.98) (6.53)
Constant 46.59** 43.57** 61.71* 67.22**
(18.69) (18.73) (32.40) (34.08)
Observations 301 258 135 94
Controls N Y N Y
Consequential Sample Only N N Y Y
R-squared <0.01 0.06 <0.01 0.12
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * represent signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Dependent Variable is stated valuation. LL, LM and LH are
ﬁrst  stage instruments. Constant term indicates the mean WTP  for ex ante low types in the LL treatment. Control variables in columns (2) and (4) are survey
round,  education, gender, ﬂood threat indicators, property owner, and environmentalist. Columns (3) and (4) include only individuals who did not perceive
results as being inconsequential.
Using the estimated parameters of the Gamma distribution we then simulated the mean and standard deviation of the
WTP distribution (Table A3). The simulation was  based on the Krinsky and Robb (1986) parametric bootstrapping technique.
Using the vector of the estimated coefﬁcients and the variance-covariance matrix we  took 104 multivariate normal draws,
and for each of the draws we drew 104 points from the gamma  distribution. These are then used to derive moments of the
distributions, while step 1 draws provide the estimates of the standard errors of these moments.
Consistent with our OLS ﬁndings, we do not ﬁnd an effect of additional information on mean WTP. In each speciﬁcation,
there is no impact of additional information on the variance of WTP. This result is somewhat surprising: even though
additional information does not impact mean WTP, a model of Bayesian updating suggests that additional information
should tighten the distribution around an (unchanging) mean (Czajkowski et. al. 2015a and Czajkowski et. al. 2015b). This
non-result is inconsistent with a model of Bayesian updating, even if type L or M subjects would update around an unbiased
(albeit imperfectly informed) mean WTP. As a result, this ﬁnding is inconsistent with a model of heterogeneous preferences
with Bayesian updating and costly search.
Appendix B. Additional willingness to pay speciﬁcations
B.1 Instrumental variables regression
We  use two different IV speciﬁcations: ﬁrst, we  restrict the estimating sample to be the ex ante low knowledge group
(Table B1) Second, we restrict the ex ante medium knowledge group (Table B2). In neither case do we  use any information
on the ex ante H information group: we are interested in the effect of new knowledge formation on WTP. The information
treatments provide exogenous variation in new knowledge created only in the ex ante L and M groups. That combined with a
small sample in the HH group cause us to not use the HH group data in this analysis. For both groups and in every speciﬁcation,
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Table  B2
IV regressions of WTP  (ex ante medium knowledge).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quiz 2 Score 11.06 8.24 13.18 11.36
(7.90) (7.20) (9.62) (8.538)
Constant −21.74 −15.38 −30.73 −55.15
(46.21) (43.53) (54.37) (49.29)
Observations 191 169 105 84
Controls N Y N Y
Consequential Sample Only N N Y Y
R-squared −0.163 −0.001 −0.232 0.118
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * represent signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Dependent Variable is stated valuation. MM and MH
are  ﬁrst stage instruments. Control variables in columns (2) and (4) are survey round, education, gender, ﬂood threat indicators, property owner, and
environmentalist. Columns (3) and (4) include only individuals who did not perceive results as being inconsequential.
Table B3
Regression of WTP  on learning.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
0-3 New Information Shown * New Information Learned −0.887 0.08 −2.07 0.85
(2.43) (2.28) (3.84) (4.31)
4-6  New Information Shown * New Information Learned 0.48 0.27 0.36 0.37
(1.31) (1.35) (2.15) (2.39)
7-9  New Information Shown * New Information Learned 0.99 0.86 1.57 2.13
(1.68) (1.39) (3.08) (2.18)
Constant 44.47*** 63.07*** 51.28*** 53.51**
(3.09) (12.11) (4.766) (21.16)
Controls N Y N Y
Consequential N N Y Y
Observations 504 431 247 179
R-squared <0.01 0.25 <0.01 0.35
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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a** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
ependent Variable is WTP. Control variables in columns (2) and (4) are survey round, education, gender, ﬂood threat indicators, property owner,
nvironmentalist and perceived consequentiality indicators. Columns (3) and (4) includes only individuals who perceive results as being consequential.
he causal impact of knowledge on valuation is not statistically different from zero. We  take this as complimentary evidence
hat there is no knowledge-based preference updating.
We  supplement these ﬁndings with estimation results which allow for valuations to vary with both the number of new
ieces of information learned and the amount of new information which is unlearned across different treatment groups.
n those speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that in no case did extra learned or unlearned information signiﬁcantly impacts valuations
e.g., we observe free disposal of information for all ex ante knowledge levels).
.2 Opportunity to learn on willingness to pay
We account for the effects of learning on WTP  in a second way to consider for differing opportunities to learn (based on
ifferent information treatments) (Eq. (B1)). In Eq. (B1) the coefﬁcients of interest are ˇL , ˇM , and ˇH . Each coefﬁcient shows
he causal effect of additional learned information conditional on the amount of new information present. For example, ˇL
epresents the effect of learned information conditional on starting off in the low ex ante information group.
WTPi =  ˛ + X ′ + 1
{
0 − 3 New Information Shown
}
∗ (New Information Learned) ˇL
+ 1
{
4 − 6 New Information Shown
}
∗ (New Information Learned) ˇM
+ 1
{
7 − 9 New Information Shown
}
∗ (NewInformation Learned) ˇH + εi (B1)
We  ﬁnd no evidence in any speciﬁcation that there is any causal effect of learning on stated WTP  (Table B3). This. n-effect
oes not vary as a function of the previous amount of information. However, the estimates are quite noisy: the ratio of the
oint estimate of each coefﬁcient to the standard error of the estimate is quite low. This is evidence there is likely to be
eterogeneity in the effect of learning on WTP. These results are robust to binning subjects according to New Information
earned as we’ve done with New Information Shown..3 Unlearned information and willingness to pay
We repeat regression (B1) but change the continuous variable to Excess Info. We deﬁne Excess Info to be the amount
f unlearned new information provided to subjects (Eq. (B2)). We  would like to determine if incomplete learning directly
ffects stated WTP. If it does then it is evidence that there is no free disposal of information. Put another way, the total
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Table B4
Regression of WTP  on excess information.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
0-3 New Information Shown * Excess Info −1.81 −2.91 −3.89 −6.41
(2.90) (2.87) (4.12) (4.35)
4-6  New Information Shown * Excess Info 2.00 0.52 2.46 1.86
(1.74) (1.64) (2.63) (2.52)
7-9  New Information Shown * Excess Info −0.63 −2.06* 0.86 0.54
(1.40) (1.25) (2.32) (2.33)
Constant 44.12*** 64.38*** 50.48*** 55.30***
(2.66) (12.33) (4.315) (21.10)
Controls N Y N Y
Consequential N N Y Y
Observations 503 430 247 179
R-squared <0.01 0.26 <0.01 0.37
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Dependent Variable is WTP. Control variables in columns (2) and (4) are survey round, education, gender, ﬂood threat indicators, property owner,
environmentalist and perceived consequentiality indicators. Columns (3) and (4) includes only individuals who  perceive results as being consequential.
quantity of information provided to subjects could be important in many economic situations.
WTPi =  ˛ + X ′ + 1
{
0 − 3 New Information Shown
}
∗ (Excess Info) ˇL + +1
{
4 − 6 New Information Shown
}
∗
(Excess Info) ˇM + 1
{
7 − 9 New Information Shown
}
∗ (Excess Info) ˇH + εi (B2)
We  ﬁnd only weak to no evidence that there could be an effect of excess information on WTP  (Table B4). For example,
there is a consistent but insigniﬁcant negative effect of excess information on WTP  for subjects shown only a small amount
of new information (e.g., 0–3 New Information Shown). However, this effect doesn’t persist across different levels of newly
shown information (e.g., 4–6 New Information Shown or 7–9 New Information Shown). We  have performed the same regression
controlling for the amount of learned information and the results are similar.
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